

THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK

A Comprehensive Guide to Reaching Agreement

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SAGE Publications

International Educational and Professional Publisher
Thousand Oaks London New Delhi

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ACTIVATING A POLICY NETWORK The Case of Mainport Schiphol

■ Peter Driessen

When we consider how to approach social problems in general and environmental problems in particular, we think first and foremost of government. Of course, one of government's major functions is to bridge social divisions by guiding social developments. Yet governments play an ambivalent role in Western societies. In practice, they perform a dual task. Besides acting as arbiter in the social arena, a public authority usually takes part as a player in the game, even performing on separate administrative levels simultaneously (Tjeenk Willink, 1980). In the role of arbiter, government is supposed to profile itself as an

institution that weighs interests by exercising its argumentation and authority and can make choices on that basis. In the role of player, we find governments that take an active stance in defending the interests of certain social groups. These governments tend to maintain close and multifaceted ties with private organizations. Actually, the "government" is composed of many government organizations. Each represents a particular interest. And each of these assumes certain delegated tasks and responsibilities related to these interests. Accordingly, the capacity of governments to resolve social problems is fragmented. ♦

This case is reprinted from "Activating a Policy Network: The Case of Mainport Schiphol" by P. Driessen, pp. 19-35 in P. Glasbergen, *Managing Environmental Disputes: Network Management as an Alternative*, 1994, with kind permission from Kluwer Academic Publishers.

 ☞ COMMENTARY

This is an account of a success story. It illustrates how an interactive negotiation process was able to harmonize environmental, economic, and developmental concerns in the extension of Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport. I certainly concur with the author that "the planning of airfields has a high potential for conflict." Analytically, the problem is complicated. There are a myriad of conflicting objectives (financial, economic development, national prestige, environmental degradation, quality of life of the abutters, housing stocks) and the various stakeholders have violently opposed trade-offs. There are numerous crucial uncertainties where experts honestly disagree. The whole problem is exacerbated by political realities and violently opposed ideologies. Still, a compromise was made that seemed to satisfy not all, but most, stakeholders. I'm not sure, however, that an analogous process would have been successful in the United States.

—Howard Raiffa, *Decision scientist*

☞ COMMENTARY

The case contains a commentary, better than any I could provide, in the form of an epilogue that brings the story up-to-date. From this observation alone, you will correctly conclude that things turn out better, or worse (or some combination of the two), than the author, reflecting on the expectations of the participants, expected. Since one of the principal aims of consensus building is to solve otherwise intractable problems by detecting possibilities that normally go unnoticed, the surprise, for better or worse, is a sign that something went wrong. As you read the account, resisting the temptation to jump to conclusions, try to discern the systematic flaw that turned an effort to extend the range of social vision into what was, in certain respects, a shortsighted project.

—Charles F. Sabel, *Political economist*

Obviously, conflict is inherent in this dual role. These unavoidable conflicts could be resolved easily if there were a hierarchical relation between the variety of government organizations. Formally, hierarchy is not entirely absent in the Dutch state system. Yet in practice, the administrative bodies are fairly independent, each carrying out its own tasks and responsibilities. Thus, the different government bodies are not tied into the kind of hierarchical relations that would permit them to approach complex social problems by work-

ing through a linear process of increasing control. Given this situation, it is imperative that the parties involved form working relationships that increase the opportunities for problem solving. This assumes that the policy network becomes activated. The government bodies involved should be urged to arrive at a joint approach to the issue by setting up a structured process of interaction and communication.

This manner of activating the policy network has a chance of succeeding only if the concerted effort yields benefits for each of

the parties separately. Therefore, an activated network must have the potential for win-win outcomes: All parties will expect to end up better off than if they had not participated.

This chapter analyzes a case in which a policy network was activated in an attempt to resolve an incoherent and fragmented act of government. This case involves a dispute about plans to expand Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport. This airport, which has a function for national, continental, and intercontinental air traffic, is situated in a highly urbanized area. Because of its presence, the quality of the surrounding environment has been under pressure for years. Nonetheless, there are ambitious plans to expand the airport. The increasing compe-

tion of other West European airports plays a significant role in these plans. As far as the Dutch government is concerned, Schiphol should grow into a mainport. In other words, it should become an airport that acts as a hub for continental and intercontinental air traffic. This development is deemed to be in the national interest. On the one hand, there is a national economic interest at stake. On the other hand, the plans trigger an environmental dispute, manifesting itself for the most part at the regional level. The population living within a 10- to 15-km radius of the airport would be subject to severe nuisances, consisting of noise and stench among other aggravations. Furthermore, the risk of hazard is highest in precisely this region. ♦

☞ COMMENTARY

One of the key features of the Amsterdam case was the prefigured decision of the central government to expand the airport into an international hub. This meant that all of the participants were forced to discover their "win-win" outcomes within the context of developmental growth. No group or agency could gain by foot-dragging or by actively seeking to derail the process. This gave the policy network immediate advantages and disadvantages. The multiple agencies of the Dutch government already knew the outcome of their process, which restricted interagency conflict. The municipal governments and citizen groups were negotiating within the context of striking the best deal possible. The disadvantages were equally evident: The process would be considered illegitimate from the start and the public would regard it as imposed rather than negotiated.

—Mark Kishlansky, *Historian*

Let us get to the heart of the matter. From an environmental perspective, restrictions should be imposed on airline activities. From an economic point of view, these activities are extremely valuable. The stalemate between the economic interests of the state and the environmental interests

of the region has existed since the 1950s. Subsequent efforts to resolve it have been to no avail. Various government bodies and private organizations are involved in this dispute. In the late 1980s, one of the government authorities took the initiative to activate the policy network as the first step

toward addressing the issue in a coordinated fashion. The following exposition reveals the approach taken to motivate the organizations involved to join the concerted effort. The analysis emphasizes the way in which participating actors achieved win-win outcomes. In addition, the analysis also elucidates the different roles played by government bodies in the decision-making process.

■ *Issues Involved in Planning Airports*

For decades, attempts to expand existing airports have led to administrative ordeals in many countries throughout the world. ♦

⇒ COMMENTARY

As an aside, in 1970, Ralph Keeney and I were asked to give partisan advice to a behemoth government agency in Mexico, the counterpart of the Ministry of Transport and Public Works in the Netherlands, which was about to enter into intergovernmental negotiations on the modernization of the existing airport in Mexico City or on the development of a new airport 25 miles north of the city. The issues and uncertainties were not much different from those of Schiphol. It became quite clear to us that our clients had already made up their minds about what was best and wanted to use our analysis not for internal decision purposes but to convince the other government agencies of the merits of their preferred alternative. As our analysis with them unfolded, trade-offs articulated, uncertainties examined, as static strategies became more dynamically intricate, our clients became slowly convinced that their preferred strategy was not very good for them or the nation. At first, they resisted what the analysis seemed to be saying, but they then succumbed to the logic of it and acted accordingly. So you see, I come to this case with the feeling that the Schiphol problem is very complicated and good analysis should be part of the negotiation process.

—Howard Raiffa, *Decision scientist*

On the one hand, growth is an economic issue. Clearly, the need to expand airports is primarily the result of a growing world economy and the concomitant demand for additional airport capacity (Zehender, 1987). In this connection, one of the main aspects of airport planning is the ability to project future demand for air transport (both passenger and freight). On the other hand, planning of airfields also involves an important environmental issue. Airports have significant impacts on their physical surroundings. The influences are many and

diverse. All over the world, noise is considered to be the biggest problem. This is most acute for airports situated near major population centers. Besides noise, air pollution and safety are major concerns. Finally, an expanding airport attracts industry. Moreover, the rising volume of incoming and outgoing passengers and freight makes it necessary to improve the infrastructure. In turn, these improvements may lead indirectly to new environmental problems at the regional level. ♦

 ☞ COMMENTARY

The other factors involved in airport expansion were national prestige and improved quality of life for members of the community. This would occur through enhanced passenger services as well as economic dimensions of growth. Forward planning necessitated expansion, as there would likely be denser populations, higher demand for air transport, and greater competition for air commerce. On the other hand, the environmental arguments against expansion were stable. Noise and stench were already at intolerable levels for local residents.

—Mark Kishlansky, *Historian*

Airlines are, for the most part, commercial ventures. Yet in many countries, government intervention in the airline sector is remarkably large (Doganis, 1992). Often, this takes the form of a controlling interest in the firms that run the airports. In some cases, it even takes the form of state enterprises. This may be explained by the economic impulses through the backward and forward links of the airline industry. It should be borne in mind that an airport is not only a place where passengers and freight are received, handled, and transferred onward. Besides an infrastructural facility, an airport is primarily a commercial service and as such can act as an economic growth pole (Kramer, 1990). Particularly with respect to large airports, airline interests are directly associated with the economic interests of the state, which need governmental protection.

Numerous publications throw light on what the planning of airfields actually entails. To name a few, studies have been conducted on London's third airport (Hall, 1980) and Paris' second (Barraqué, 1993); the new airports in Tokyo (Radford & Giesen, 1984) and Munich (Kretschmer, 1984); and the expansion of the airports in Frankfurt (Rucht, 1984) and Bremen (Strubelt & Adam, 1993). These studies reveal that the planning of airfields has a

high potential for conflict. Often, many parties are involved in disputes, which usually derive from controversies between government and citizens (who are concerned about the quality of their environment), between government and firms (which sometimes incur damage to their economic interests), or between various government bodies (as a consequence of divergent interests or an ambivalent division of competence). The studies cited above also identify three important characteristics of these disputes.

First, research plays a key role in these controversies. This pertains to research on, for instance, the need to build a new airport or expand the existing one, or it may concern the most desirable infrastructure in and around the airport. The research may deal with the profitability of operation, it may investigate the economic impact of the airport, or it may consider possible negative effects on the environment. Of course, research may not play an "objective" role in the decision-making process. Nonetheless, it still plays a role in the conflict of interests. This is expressed in the dissent over research results and the frequent request for a second opinion.

A second feature is that legal proceedings are often brought to bear in an attempt to force a breakthrough in the dispute. ♦

 ⇨ COMMENTARY

Legal proceedings are usually seen as inimical to consensus building despite the fact that they use a form of dispute resolution structurally akin to binding arbitration. Legal decisions can be a positive part of consensus building in that they represent bedrock positions that each side must accept and from which other issues can be resolved. Because lawsuits are expensive, time-consuming, and usually involve winner-take-all outcomes, they are rarely seen as integral to long-term consensus building. Indeed, the threat of lawsuits usually signals the breakdown of negotiated settlements, and are an action of last resort.

—Mark Kishlansky, *Historian*

Legal proceedings are mostly initiated by those parties who have no access to the formal decision-making process or who cannot exert enough influence by way of discussion and negotiation.

Third, in connection with the above points, these disputes are rarely resolved in a manner that is satisfactory to all parties. The outcome is often a long, drawn-out delay in work on the project, a hopeless stalemate in the decision-making process, or cessation of the project. These scenarios may also be classified as lose-lose or win-lose situations.

■ *The Development of Schiphol Airport*

For many years, conflicts have beset the planning of Schiphol Airport, located adjacent to the city of Amsterdam. A debate has been going on since the 1950s regarding how and how much the further development of the airport should take into account the negative effects on the environment. Noise nuisance is a key issue in this debate. In the meantime, many investigations have been carried out, plans have been published, and legal proceedings have been conducted. None of these efforts,

however, have led to a solution to the problem. The dispute about the expansion of Schiphol continually receives new impetus from economic developments. In recent years, these impulses have been felt more acutely. The airline industry is in flux, especially because of the trend toward “internationalization.” Not only airports but also airlines have to meet tougher international competition. In this way, the international component of business management is becoming increasingly important.

In the near future, competition between the European airports is expected to become stiffer. In part, this is due to the creation of a single European market for air transport. Competition will tend to concentrate the intercontinental traffic at a limited number of European destinations. The Dutch government seeks to bolster Schiphol’s position to secure the airport’s future as a motor for the Dutch economy. Thus, Amsterdam is supposed to occupy a key position in continental and intercontinental air traffic.

In 1992, Schiphol ranked fifth among European airports in terms of number of passengers (after London, Paris, Frankfurt, and Rome); in terms of freight, Amsterdam came in fourth (after Frankfurt, London, and Paris) (NV Luchthaven Schiphol, 1993). Schiphol handled 19.1 million pas-

sengers and 695,000 tons of freight in that year. Amsterdam's biggest competitor is Paris. The possibilities for expansion at London's Heathrow Airport (presently, more than three times the size of Schiphol) are already limited. The airport at Frankfurt is expected to gradually relinquish some of its capacity to a new central airport in Berlin. And Brussels' Zaventem Airport is already behind in development. In contrast, Charles de Gaulle Airport near Paris still has wide room for expansion.

The fervent competition between airports is fueled by the increasing competition between carriers. A trend is emerging toward ever-larger companies in the industry and more cooperation between them, which leads to economies of scale. Naturally, an airport can corner a bigger piece of the market if it can host several big airlines (the *mega-carriers*).

■ *The Policy Network*

From the beginning, various government organizations have been involved in the

development of Schiphol Airport. The main players are three ministries. The Ministry of Transport and Public Works is by far the most important actor in the policy network. This ministry is formally responsible for airport planning, and its jurisdiction is circumscribed in the Aviation Act, which regulates the development of airfields as well as the abatement of noise nuisance. Thus, the Ministry of Transport and Public Works is responsible for the economic development of the airport as well as (an aspect of) environmental quality. Second, the Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment is also involved. This ministry implements policy regarding the rest of the environmental effects of the activities of the airline industry, namely, air pollution, stench, and hazard. Moreover, this ministry is responsible for physical planning in the Netherlands. Finally, the Ministry of Economic Affairs plays an important role. This ministry pursues further economic development in the region of Schiphol. ➦

➦ COMMENTARY

The involvement of overlapping government agencies in the policy network posed particular problems in the development of a consensual decision. Though the three Dutch government agencies with jurisdictional authority over airport expansion necessarily accepted the mandate for airport expansion, each had more at stake than achieving this outcome. Interagency rivalry and power would have to play a critical part in the positions the ministries adopted and the coalitions they built during negotiations. This fragmentation of government would have had even greater impact if the decision on expansion had been open-ended. It might have been possible for opposing groups to ally with one ministry or another on jurisdictional rather than policy grounds.

—Mark Kishlansky, *Historian*

Lower tiers of government also play a role in Schiphol's development. The prov-

ince of North Holland and the municipalities surrounding the airport are the

authorities most deeply involved. The province is responsible for environmental policy and planning for the region. The surrounding municipalities have a variety of interests. To varying degrees, all enjoy the benefits and endure the aggravation of having the airport close by. The benefits take the form of firms that locate in the vicinity of the airport, thus creating more jobs and income in local taxes. The aggravation takes the form of noise, stench, air pollution, and other activities that degrade the environment. The municipality of Haarlemmermeer is a special case, because the airport lies within its territory. Accordingly, this municipality is authorized to create a land use plan for the airfield.

Finally, two enterprises play a crucial role in the policy network: NV Luchthaven Schiphol (Schiphol Airport, Inc.) and KLM. The former is the company that operates the airport, and it is entirely state owned. The national government holds about three-fourths of the shares in this company, and the rest is owned by the municipalities of Amsterdam (22 percent) and Rotterdam (2 percent). KLM, the major Dutch carrier, is partly owned by the state (about one-third of the shares) and has a large stake in the expansion of the airport. Thus, the government has a strong influence on the major Dutch air transport companies. This is why the interests of air transport are considered national interests that warrant governmental protection. As noted above, this situation is similar to that found in many other Western countries.

■ *Impasse in Decision Making*

In the policy network described above, diverse interests come into play. Their tasks and responsibilities are dispersed over

many actors. To date, it has not been possible to reach consensus within this network on the future development of Schiphol Airport. As pointed out earlier, tension between growth of the airport and urban expansion in the surrounding area has been building up since the 1950s.

For years, there has been a lack of clarity on the developments impinging on Schiphol (de Maar, 1976; Driessen, Glasbergen, & Spek, 1993). First of all, there was uncertainty about noise nuisance. It took a long time for noise to be acknowledged as a problem and to find a way of calculating the level of distress. A system was developed in the Netherlands to measure noise nuisance in the mid-1960s. However, there is still no agreement on how it should be applied. For instance, there is some discussion about how to determine the threshold value for maximum admissible noise nuisance. Furthermore, opinions differ on setting a specific norm for night flights. The disagreement revolves around the degree to which departing and arriving airplanes disturb the sleep of nearby residents, and whether such disruption is detrimental to public health. With regard to both of these discussions, it should be pointed out that setting norms will automatically decrease the options for expanding the airport (unless, e.g., it is decided to demolish some buildings). But restrictions on expansion also impose limits on the airport's function as an economic growth pole. Second, there was uncertainty about how rapidly air traffic would increase and the degree to which technical developments in aeronautics would be able to help reduce noise levels. In this regard, the question arose whether aircraft that make less noise would be built in the future.

Both of these uncertainties had an effect, especially at the municipal level. In the

1960s and 1970s, municipalities in the surrounding area did not have sufficient information on the long-term development of Schiphol or on the possible consequences of growth of noise nuisance. In those days, there was a severe housing shortage in the Netherlands, and it was acute in the region where the airport is located. That housing shortage demanded a quick response. In that context, urban extensions steadily encroached on the airfield; with hindsight, this was not a good solution. A complicating factor is that in the past, hardly any discussion took place between the various actors. There was insufficient insight into the problem and no consensus on how to resolve it. Not surprisingly, every actor basically set his or her own course. In a sense, Schiphol developed in a vacuum. No dialogue took place with the surrounding area, and the neighboring municipalities extended their residential areas without consulting the airport authorities. Only in the mid-1970s were both developments—the extension of the airport and the growth of the urban agglomeration—more closely linked. But by that time, the problem of noise had taken on major proportions. Construction of four takeoff and landing runways had been completed, and the largest urban extensions in the area were already in place.

Finally, it should be noted that the problems concerning Schiphol could not be resolved within the context of the existing policy network. As pointed out earlier, the Ministry of Transport and Public Works occupied a pivotal position in this network. It was responsible for both the economic development of Schiphol and the abatement of noise nuisance. In the Netherlands, environmental policy—and thus noise abatement—constitutes a primary task of

the Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment. Accordingly, at the end of the 1970s, it was agreed that noise produced by aircraft would be regulated by the Aviation Act, for which the Ministry of Transport and Public Works was responsible. Yet this ministry also proved unable to balance the interests of the air transport industry and those of the environmental movement. A wide-ranging plan—the Outline Plan for Civil Aviation Airfields—was designed to resolve the problem of noise. However, this plan was never fully implemented. In addition, the growth of Schiphol was designated as being in the interest of the nation. The objections that had been raised with regard to noise were apparently considered less important. For a long time, it was firmly believed that measures to prevent noise nuisance would prematurely curtail Schiphol's options for expansion. This attitude reflects a preference for technical solutions. In this vein, it was initially expected that technological innovations would keep the noise level of future aircraft much lower; thus, the problem would largely go away by itself.

In the mid-1980s, decision making on the extension of the airfield had reached a deadlock. The parties could not agree on how much the airport should be allowed to grow, nor could they agree on how to tackle the environmental problems. In particular, the parties involved held different opinions on the future configuration of the runways, the abatement of noise nuisance, and regulation of night flights. The NV Luchthaven Schiphol also made ambitious plans in the mid-1980s—in the wake of the economic recession—to eventually make Schiphol one of Europe's mainports (Commissie Van der Zwan, 1986).

■ *Breaking the Impasse by Activating the Policy Network*

In 1988, the Dutch government made a crucial statement in an important national memorandum on physical planning. In this document, the government posited that in the light of the recent economic revitalization, the development of Schiphol into a mainport should be fostered. The rationale was that development in this direction would provide a major impulse for employment. Yet Schiphol should only be allowed to grow along these lines if its development was accompanied by improvement in the environmental quality in the surrounding

areas. The elusive goal to bridge the gap between economic growth and improvement of environmental quality was thought to be within reach by taking a coordinated approach to the problem. To that end, an integral plan had to be made for the Schiphol region. At the very least, this plan would have to include a perspective on the development of the airport up to the year 2015 (Vierde Nota, 1988).

This statement gave new impetus to the effort to resolve the problems related to the airport. The primary responsibility for the tasks proposed in that landmark document was the Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment. ♦

☞ COMMENTARY

The leadership role assumed by the Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment appears to have been fortuitous rather than preconceived. Because this ministry was likely to be the strongest voice for environmental concerns, the fact that it took the initiative in orchestrating the process preserved the environmental voice, on the one hand, and co-opted it to expansion, on the other. As the author later notes, "Because people realized that the project would be carried out no matter what . . . many parties chose to cooperate."

—Mark Kishlansky, *Historian*

This ministry had never played a leading role in the policy network. Nonetheless, authorities at the ministry decided to break through the administrative barriers to further development of the airport. This was to be achieved by designing an organizational framework for the discussion whereby the coordinated approach would be given a concrete form. In other words, the ministry took the initiative to activate the policy network. This move reflected the ministry's desire to bring into the fore-

ground the environmental interests at play. This goal could be achieved only if the ministry were to take an active role at an early stage in formulating the new plan. Because of this initiative, the Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment acquired a dual function in the project. It had to take care of setting up the project and managing it, and it also had to secure the input of environmental interests in the decision making. ♦

 ☞ COMMENTARY

From my perspective, and acting with hindsight, I applaud the leadership taken by the Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment in activating the policy network. That ministry played a dual role: one, as an interested party, and two, as a convenor, chair, and facilitator of the planning process. I found it interesting that, as revealed shortly, it was the parties represented in the steering committee that “ruled the roost” and shared in the “all gain” results. There is a lesson here for other negotiations: If you want to share in the joint gains, get included!

—Howard Raiffa, *Decision scientist*

At first, this raised suspicion among other government bodies. The initiative to start such a project had been taken away from the Ministry of Transport and Public Works. Moreover, the latter ministry had a strong affiliation with one of the project’s two aims. Other parties wondered whether they would be able to take a neutral position in the ensuing discussion. But their initial wariness soon gave way to a realistic attitude. Because people realized that the project would be carried out no matter what—it had the backing of a government decree—many parties chose to cooperate. They felt it was better to jump into the fray rather than wait out the game on the sidelines. Then, too, they recognized that as lone operators, none of the parties would be able to break the deadlock in decision making about the expansion of the airport.

The organizational structure that was set up for this project consisted of a project

group and a steering committee. The latter comprised eight organizations: the Ministry of Transport and Public Works; the Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment; the Ministry of Economic Affairs; the province of North Holland; the municipalities of Amsterdam and Haarlemmermeer; NV Luchthaven Schiphol; and KLM. The project group first had a much broader base. So as not to alienate other municipalities that might be important discussion partners in the stages of brainstorming and implementation of the plan, it was decided to include these parties in the project group. It soon proved, however, that the parties represented in the steering committee ruled the roost, while the others were gradually shunted onto a sidetrack. With hindsight, this was not surprising, because only a select few could book “all-gain” results. ♦♦

 ☞ COMMENTARY

Again it is instructive to note the ad hoc nature of the structures for problem solving. The creation of a policy committee composed of all interested groups and of a steering committee of essential power brokers gave way to the omnipotence of the steering committee alone. It is not clear that the members of the policy committee who were eventually excluded from decision making were those who could not “book ‘all-gain’

results,” or were simply those not powerful enough to block or advance progress. Nevertheless, a process that excludes interests that cannot be part of a win-win solution will have difficulty building consensus or achieving compliance. Again, in this case the imposed nature of the outcome (in principle though not in detail) had an effect on which groups could be comfortably encompassed in decision making.

—Mark Kishlansky, *Historian*

As soon as all parties had agreed to participate in the project, a joint statement of intent was drawn up in the form of a covenant specifying the aim of the project, the policy standpoints, the organizational structure, and the financing of that organization. Furthermore, this document clearly explained why cooperation was essential. It argued that the tension between economics and the environment could be relieved only by reaching consensus. At the same time, the covenant also attested to the existence of mutual rivalry. As a case in point, the Ministry of Transport and Public Works and the province of North Holland added a statement to the covenant elaborating on their own interests and stance on policy. In doing so, they set the stage for the negotiation process that was yet to be started.

After the necessity of cooperation was acknowledged by all parties involved, the formulation of plans could begin. As the plans were being hammered out, consensus had to be reached between the parties on a development perspective for the Schiphol region, and on measures to actually implement this perspective.

The plans were formulated in three stages—the three different strategies that were deployed to come to agreement between the parties.

- The *cognitive* stage was directed toward gathering and exchanging information.

- The *productive* stage was directed toward decision making on the main points of discussion.
- The *formalizing* stage concerns final decision making and the creation of social and political legitimacy for the plan.

It should be borne in mind that the clustering of these activities was not determined beforehand; rather, these stages were only distinguished afterward.

■ *The Cognitive Stage in the Process of Formulating a Plan*

The strategy followed by the project leaders at this stage was to bring the various parties closer together by conducting investigations and exchanging information. It was assumed that sharing information might contribute to a better understanding and more appreciation for each other's standpoints. And that, of course, was expected to help the parties reach consensus.

The activities in this stage centered on a project program, a research program, and the development of three scenarios. An important function of the project program was to chart the diverse standpoints. In addition, an inventory was made of bottlenecks and gaps in knowledge as a first step toward finding solutions. On the basis of the project program, it was decided to con-

tinue by way of a research track and a scenario track. In the research track, 13 investigations were delegated. For each of these, an advisory committee was recruited from members of the project group. By drawing the interested parties into active participation in the investigations, it was hoped to maximize agreement on the research results. A separate group was cre-

ated to develop scenarios. This group made three projections, each corresponding to the number of passengers that could be transported per year and the concomitant number of flights departing and arriving at the airport. Calculations for the year 2015 put the high scenario at 60 million passengers, the middle scenario at 40 million, and the low one at 20 million. ♦♦

⇒ COMMENTARY

I found the initial proposal to work simultaneously on several scenarios quite appropriate, as was the decision to concentrate on the accumulation of information for subsequent decision making.

There seemed to be no need for a professional facilitator in the cognitive stage of deliberations. All was orderly while information was being collected, analyzed, and disseminated. That's not always the case. A facilitator with problem-solving, analytical skills could often contribute to structuring the problem.

—Howard Raiffa, *Decision scientist*

⇒ COMMENTARY

The decision to create research groups and scenario groups brought the process of decision making forward by linking empirical information to potential outcomes. While this first stage generated contention, it actually had the effect of narrowing the issues of dispute and creating coalitions around potential scenarios seen as more or less favorable to the different interests. While this did not result in reaching an agreement, it nevertheless moved the process forward and gave way to concrete disputes over an actual plan rather than general disputes over principles.

—Mark Kishlansky, *Historian*

In this stage, there were already signs that the parties were forming coalitions. The municipality of Haarlemmermeer and the province of North Holland together comprised the environmental coalition. These parties attached most importance to a high-quality environment in which to live. The mainport coalition consisted of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the

Ministry of Transport and Public Works, along with the municipality of Amsterdam, NV Luchthaven Schiphol, and KLM. These partners rallied around the economic interests of the airport. The Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment was in limbo, pulled by two opposing sets of demands: to manage the project as best as possible, and to defend the environ-

mental interests. Obviously, this ministry did not fit neatly into one of the coalitions.

When the investigations and scenario studies were finished, the project leaders set out to write a draft plan. This plan was met with a rain of criticism and, understandably, was not released. This setback indicated that the time was not ripe for decision making. The material was extremely complex and the parties still disagreed on many issues. Many points proved to be unclear or subject to differences of opinion. For instance, the following were still under discussion: adjustment of the system of take-off and landing runways, setting norms for noise nuisance, setting a specific norm for night flights, possibly using high-speed rail links as a substitute for continental flights, relocating air transport activities to other airports,

and manner and degree of financial commitment to the agreements yet to be made. In view of the dissent in the steering committee on the initial draft plan, the project leaders decided to switch to a different approach. This decision also marked a clear transition in the process of formulating the plan.

■ *The Productive Stage in the Process of Formulating a Plan*

The next stage was no longer concerned with increasing the supply of information. Instead, the parties sought to digest what they had and to arrive at a decision. A facilitator was recruited for this new “game,” which was aimed at decision making. ♦♦

◀ COMMENTARY

The first efforts at resolution revealed the fault lines among the interests on the steering committee; it is interesting to note that it was only at that point that a facilitator was brought into the process. The risks involved in not using a facilitator earlier were minimized in this case because there was little chance the negotiations would break down in the wake of the government mandate to develop a plan of expansion. In other cases, the use of a facilitator at the fact-finding stage is critical to ensure the integrity of the research being done or potential scenarios being created. Similarly, in the Amsterdam airport case the facilitator could focus immediately on the bottlenecks in the process rather than attempt to deal first with peripheral issues on which agreement was more easily secured. There was no need to build momentum toward closure as closure was already presupposed.

—Mark Kishlansky, *Historian*

The task of the “outsider” was to guide the negotiations between the parties. This slot was filled by a person who held an inde-

pendent position with respect to the parties involved and was also well informed on the issues. ♦♦

 ☞ COMMENTARY

Evidently, in moving from the cognitive stage to the decision-framing stage (I prefer *framing* here to *making*), emotion heated up and a professional facilitator was introduced—someone skilled in running meetings efficiently, in the conduct of human relations, and in negotiation processes. It is not clear whether the facilitator had staff support and whether the facilitator had analytical, problem-solving skills. Did the facilitator generate substantive proposals for the consideration of the negotiation parties? Or did the facilitator assume a more passive role?

—Howard Raiffa, *Decision scientist*

The approach taken by the facilitator was aimed at bringing the main bottlenecks to the fore. In that way, opportunities arose to reach agreement, at least on key points, between the parties. The approach was characterized by the creation of a strong interaction between the project group and the steering committee. The latter was confronted with issues that the project group had pared down to size. The steering committee reviewed the issues and approved the solutions offered by the project group. In the event that approval was withheld, the issue was sent back to the project group, where renewed attempts would have to be made to reach consensus. Thus, a cyclical process came about. The approach consisted of five steps.

Step 1

First, an inventory was made of the most important points for discussion. This was done with the aid of blank sheets of paper taped to the wall, on which possible topics were posted. Using colored stickers, members of the project group could indicate their assessment of the topics. They had to name the topics that would require a state-

ment. In this fashion, the main issues were distilled. The following points for discussion emerged from the inventory: configuration of the runway system, abatement of noise nuisance, a regulation for night flights, the relocation of activities to other airports (e.g., training flights), the substitution of high-speed trains for continental flights, infrastructure around the airport, development of industrial premises, taking action on air pollution, financing of the measures, and procedures for decision making once the plan has been established.

Step 2

Subsequently, the problem had to be defined for each topic. Certain problems were split up into subsets. An attempt was made to give a precise description for each of these (sub)problems.

Step 3

When the inventory was complete, members of the project group were asked to offer a solution for the various problems. As a rule, the members with the deepest involvement in a problem and the most

divergent opinions were supposed to write a joint memo on the question. In case they could not agree on certain aspects, the differing insights could be expressed.

Step 4

Ultimately, this approach resulted in a number of memos on the problems that emerged during the inventory round. These reports identified some possible directions for solutions. The documents were circulated among the members of each project group for their comments. Then the memos and the notes made on them were collected. At that point, the facilitator set about re-writing them in the form of reports on decision points. These reports were organized in the following way. A proposition was formulated for each topic. It was accompanied by proposals for a direction in which to find a solution and, where possible, proposals for concrete decisions. The following information was provided on each topic:

- formulation of the first draft plan,
- the problem for which a solution should be sought,
- one or more directions for a solution, and
- proposals for a decision on content or procedures.

Step 5

The reports on decision points were finally submitted to the steering committee for a decision. In case the committee was unable to approve any of the proposals, that particular topic was sent back to the project group, accompanied by the committee's comments, and the procedures were repeated. This stepwise approach was repeated in three rounds. In these three cycles of decision making, all the discussion points were dealt with. Consensus was reached on the main thrust of these points. Thus, the approach was successful and led to a new draft plan on which all parties agreed. ♦♦

☞ COMMENTARY

I think it is fair to say that the five steps described here, the "productive stage in the process of formulating a plan" were conducted in a spirit of what I call fair, open, truthful exchange (FOTE). It was great that this was the case and it's a tribute to the Dutch. Such amicable accord of process may not be so readily achievable in other cultures. From my negotiation perspective, what the facilitator did in Steps 1 to 4 was to generate a template (a framework for decision making) describing the key issues that needed to be resolved and suggested resolutions for these issues. Presumably, the parties shared their preferences with each other, and I assume they did not posture or play strategic coalitional games. Great!

It is at the close of Stage 4 and 5 that the process seems fuzzy to me and where it is lucky that agreement was achieved. I am left with the impression that each issue was resolved separately by the steering committee by consensus. This seems surprising to me. I would suspect that a good deal of logrolling would have taken place. "I will give in on issue X if I can get my way on issue Y." I also would have guessed that coalitions would have formed in these claiming procedures.

—Howard Raiffa, *Decision scientist*

 ☞ COMMENTARY

The staged process of focusing around disagreements and refining compromises allowed the facilitator to bring competing interests together. The use of mixed groups with opposing viewpoints led to constant face-to-face bargaining in the small groups. Competing interests would state alternate plans and then be forced to find common ground among them. This is a technique that often works when individuals are highly motivated to find agreement, but it can also lead to irreconcilable positions on major issues.

—Mark Kishlansky, *Historian*

■ *The Formalizing Stage in the Process of Formulating a Plan*

Up to that point, the discussion and negotiation process took place within a closed circuit. In fact, only the parties represented in the project group and the steering committee had the opportunity to influence the

development of the plan. Once the draft plan was made public, the process of consensus building came into a new phase. At that point, the central aim was to gain social and political legitimacy. Concretely, this meant that the plan had to be opened up to public discussion, and the reactions had to be taken into account in the final version. ☞

 ☞ COMMENTARY

Now comes disclosure to the public. The facilitator deserves a lot of credit for presenting choices in a way that did not polarize the public. Perhaps even more credit goes to the Dutch temperament. In the United States, life would have been more complicated. Maybe not as complicated as was the case in Israel and the Palestinian Authority when Oslo accords were made public, but something like that typically happens when quasi-secret deliberations are made public and the “losers” can identify themselves. In the United States, the “losers” have a fluid mobility to organize into blocking coalitions.

—Howard Raiffa, *Decision scientist*

☞ COMMENTARY

Attempting to build consensus after the hammering out of the various compromises is the most interesting part of the Amsterdam airport case. Normally, efforts at consensus building would take place before the actual processes of decision making had gone very far. In this case, the decision to exclude participation from the public and to restrict the number of options that the government would allow to be considered had the effect of inverting a normal consensus building. What is interesting, however, is that these decisions did not prevent efforts at achieving agreement.

—Mark Kishlansky, *Historian*

And when this was done, the plan had to be submitted for approval to Parliament, the provincial executive of North Holland, and the municipal councils of Amsterdam and Haarlemmermeer.

This stage was extremely complex for two reasons. First, it proved that the “closed circuit” approach had a major drawback: The citizens of the region were suddenly confronted with a plan they had hardly heard of before. In fact, few people even knew it was in preparation. Not surprisingly, there was a great deal of criticism of the approach taken. The psychological effect was adverse; the plan was generally received with suspicion. The authorities were accused of making a deal with industry and of having ignored the interests of the local residents.

Second, the parties in the steering committee decided to organize a separate public discussion for each of their constituencies and to hold political consultation. The government authorities in particular were of the opinion that this was not a joint responsibility of the steering committee but a task that each tier of government should perform independently. The rationale was that each authority knew best how to inform its populace. As a result, the public discussion did not proceed in a coordinated fashion, and each government resorted to its own method of public discussion. For instance, both the province of North Holland and the municipality of Haarlemmermeer held public hearings to give the population the chance to respond to the plan. The municipality of Amsterdam, by contrast, chose an entirely different approach. Instead of inviting the public to react to the plan, the municipal council held a survey among 35 selected organizations. The questionnaire was constructed such that

the respondents would be confronted with the whole range of opposing forces: on the one hand, the force in favor of developing the airport into a mainport, on the other, the force for improving the quality of the residential environment. One example is that environmental organizations were requested to consider the economic consequences of not extending the airport. And representatives of industry, by contrast, were asked how developing a mainport would affect the quality of the local environment. This approach prevented the respondents from using the survey to defend their own interests exclusively.

In view of the purpose of this stage, another strategy had to be found to retain the consensus already achieved. The facilitator’s main focus of attention at this point was the steering committee. The project group was only expected to complete a few investigations and recommendations. In this stage, the facilitator had to keep in mind that each party might take criticism of the plan as a lever to reopen discussion on memos that had already been submitted. Therefore, the facilitator sought to prevent the parties from deviating from the main course and thus undermining any compromise already reached. Accordingly, his approach was first to keep the parties in continual contact, whereby everyone had the maximum information on progress in the discussions on content. This led, for instance, to frequent bilateral discussion. Second, the facilitator took upon himself the task of writing the final text of the plan. All the standpoints and motions emanating from the political consultations were compiled, organized, and translated into draft texts. These drafts were repeatedly rewritten in response to remarks from the steering committee. ♦

 ⇨ COMMENTARY

What emerges from this final stage is the realization that consensus is secondary to maintaining the integrity of the sets of compromises created by the steering committee. For this reason, the facilitator found it necessary to become an open advocate for the agreement rather than an agent of the process. Writing the final text of the plan gave the facilitator power to shape the final agreement in ways that may not have been anticipated when the role was first defined. This is an example of how open-ended processes sometimes create the best opportunities for bringing opposing interests together.

—Mark Kishlansky, *Historian*

This approach was also successful. The original plan was revised at certain points, but the consensus remained intact. Agreement was reached on reduction of noise nuisance and hazard. This was accomplished, for instance, by changing the system of runways on the airfield (constructing a fifth runway and changing the angle of an existing one); other key changes were the exclusion of noisy aircraft and the substitution of high-speed train connections

for continental flights. Furthermore, agreement was reached on setting a threshold for noise nuisance and on providing additional sound insulation for dwellings in the vicinity (the process of insulating against sound had already been started in the 1980s). With regard to the rest of the environmental effects (stench, safety, and air pollution), agreement was reached on the aims, while concrete measures were left to a later stage of plan elaboration. ♦

 ⇨ COMMENTARY

Sidestepping the details of contentious issues is a common technique in efforts to build or maintain a consensus. It is predicated on the assumption that people co-opted into the process will ultimately compromise details rather than derail an entire agreement. This probably fails as often as it succeeds. It takes a shrewd facilitator to assess which critical details will shatter the process entirely.

—Mark Kishlansky, *Historian*

The whole package of measures would permit the airport to grow to roughly 40 to 45 million passengers per year by 2015; eventually, the environmental load would be reduced.

On the basis of the plan, the parties involved drafted a covenant containing the main agreements. The covenant had the status of a statement of intent. It explicitly

mentioned that the perspective expressed in the plan would be carried out jointly by the parties. Moreover, it reported that the plan would be elaborated further by way of various procedures before implementation could be started.

It should be borne in mind that in the case reviewed here, the parties reached agreement on a long-term development

perspective. A perspective of this nature was desirable to build a unified front for further negotiations on actual steps to be taken. And this perspective specifies the main directions for future expansion for the airfield. Clarity on these options is imperative for the parties representing the economic interests. And for the parties dedicated to defending environmental interests, assurance was given that the major environmental problems caused by air transport will be dealt with.

In the next few years, this development perspective will have to be worked out as measures for implementation. Therefore, the parties were unable to make hard-and-fast agreements. At this stage of the discussion, neither government bodies nor private organizations could afford to promise concrete results. In the stage of plan elaboration, it will prove whether the consensus built among the parties is actually durable.

■ *Further Analysis of the Process of Activating the Policy Network*

The case reviewed here demonstrates that government bodies and private organizations need each other to devise an effective approach to environmental issues. In the past, it proved impossible to resolve the dispute over extension of the airfield. In many respects, it was a no-win situation. When acting independently, none of the parties was able to come any closer to achieving its goal. To break the deadlock, the policy network was activated by starting a structured process of interaction and communication.

The case of Schiphol leads to the conclusion that the process of activating a net-

work proceeds by stages. These have been discussed at greater or lesser length in the above section and are also treated in the literature on activating networks (Soeters, 1991). These are the *initiative*, *cognitive*, *productive*, and *formalization* stages.

In the initiative stage, attention is primarily focused on mobilization of the parties who should be included in tackling the problem. This is the stage in which the ideas of common interest and interdependence are noticed by one of the parties. The initiator then seeks to involve other parties in a structured process of interaction and communication. In this process, it is imperative to convince the various parties of the added value to be derived from a concerted effort and the benefits to be gained by the individual parties. The strategy to be deployed at this stage should therefore make it clear that autonomous development—that is, development without a concerted effort—is not attractive to any of the parties involved. This stage can lead to a joint statement of intent in which the necessity of acting in concert is endorsed by all parties.

Subsequently, both the cognitive and the productive stages emphasize activating the processes of interaction and communication between the parties. These two stages should lead to convergence between the diverse definitions of the situation. Moreover, the actors should harmonize their moves. In both stages, special methods must be applied to get the parties to actually come to an agreement.

The cognitive stage is directed at the exchange of information and new ideas. Its aim is to influence the way the parties perceive the problem. At this stage, joint investigations and information exchange projects are set up. In this way, the parties can get acquainted with each other. The

aims of this stage are to make an inventory of the problems, to reach agreement on the precise wording of these problems, and if possible, to determine goals for the projects. The strategy should be to start an open dialogue as a way to help the various parties show more understanding for each other's standpoints. More knowledge about the issue and a deeper appreciation of each other's interests could encourage the parties to reach consensus.

In the third stage of the process of activating the policy network, there is a concerted "production" effort. Decisions on the main issues are conscientiously prepared. They form the basis for compromise: on directions in which to find solutions, on measures of implementation, and on financing. In fact, the willingness of the various parties to follow through is determined in this productive stage. This is precisely the point at which it becomes clear what sacrifices have to be made and what benefits may be distributed; alternatives for behavior will be restricted and/or broadened. Usually, this is when it will first be clear whether win-win outcomes are actually feasible. The negotiations between the various parties will be ruthless at this stage. Therefore, the strategy of using an (external) facilitator to methodically structure the negotiating process will pay off in this stage (Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987).

In the last stage, formalization, agreements are recast as a plan and possibly also a covenant. At the same time, the plan has to be formally recognized. Its social and political basis can be confirmed by subjecting it to procedures for public discussion and administrative decision making. In this stage, a transition takes place from internal decision making to external legitimation. On the basis of the definitive arrangements

that are ultimately made, new dependency relations emerge between the parties.

■ Conclusions

This chapter has discussed the main characteristics of the process by which networks are activated. This process was illustrated by sketching a dispute surrounding the extension of an airfield, namely, Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport. The core of this dispute is that environmental policy would require restrictions on air transport activities—due to objections regarding noise nuisance, stench, hazard, and air pollution—whereas these activities are extremely important from an economic point of view. In this situation, it is inconceivable that the activities taking place in and around the airfield would be forced to stop completely. Accordingly, the environment would continue to be subjected to some degree of stress in the future. The question arises how environmental aims can be harmonized and what role the government can play in this effort.

This case illustrates that the government plays various roles in resolving the problem of planning for an airfield. Earlier, I used the term *dual role* in this connection. The government takes the role of an arbiter in the social arena, while also taking part as a player in the game. The latter role is also taken by a government body that pursues purely private interests. Air transport is a case in point; this is an area where public and private interests are closely interwoven. This dual role generates conflicts that are not easily resolved, due to the absence of a hierarchy in government organization. The result is often a lack of coherence in governmental acts. This problem is

all the more urgent because the government's need to direct developments has increased considerably over the past few years. Social problems are increasing in complexity and scale. Environmental issues form a good example of this trend. The good intentions to do something about these problems can usually not be achieved. This is because in practice, the capacity of the government to control developments remains limited.

In the case described here, we also observed that government control can be increased by activating networks. In this way, the coherence of government policy can be enhanced: Government organizations are encouraged to set up a joint approach to the problem, together with private organizations. The controversies between public and private actors did not arise in this case. The approach described here even led to a breakthrough in the decision-making impasse. The success of activating a network in this case depended on four factors. First, it was demonstrated that autonomous development, being the continuation of the current situation, was not appealing to any of the parties involved. In other words, it was a lose-lose situation. Second, it was made clear that the parties involved were not able to break the deadlock on their own and bring the resolution of the problems any closer. All parties acknowledged that they needed each other to arrive at a fruitful approach to the issue. Third, in a more or less intuitive manner, the planning process evolved such that in each stage—initiative, cognitive, productive, and formalization—appropriate strategies were applied to promote consensus between the parties. Fourth, a perspective was developed for the future of the region, in which environmental and economic goals were related to each other. This development perspective

was taken as a package deal by the parties involved; it was a package with which each of them would eventually win more than they stood to lose.

Let us return to the question posed at the beginning of this section. Indeed, the government can play a dual role in harmonizing environmental and economic goals. First of all, in the role of manager, the government can try to organize decision-making arrangements between the actors with the most interests at stake. In this role, the authorities will have to attempt to bridge the conflicts of interest between public and private actors. This can be done, for instance, by setting conditions on further development to the benefit of all parties. In performing this role, the emphasis lies on communication and guidance. This chapter has given depth to that role, elaborating on the way in which the policy network was activated and on how the interaction and communication processes between the parties involved were shaped. Second, complementary to its first role, government can act as arbiter to combat excesses. In this role, the authorities will carefully monitor the compliance with agreements on reduction of the environmental load. Moreover, they will have to ensure that every possible effort will be made to prevent further deterioration of the environment in the vicinity of the airfield. Thus, network management does not neutralize the dual role of the government. In fact, it adds a new role to the interplay. The government takes on a third task: to manage the organization of decision-making arrangements between the various actors. This third role represents an attempt to compensate for the conflicts of interest inherent in government's traditional roles of arbiter and player.

■ Epilogue

It might be logical to conclude that the method employed to activate a policy network was successful. A plan for the extension of Schiphol Airport emerged, and a consensus was attained between all concerned parties. The crucial question, however, is whether this consensus subsequently led to resolution of the problem. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The problem of reconciling economic and environmental interests is an infinitely complex one in which technical and social factors play an important role. The aviation sector

is an economic growth engine, which in the past rarely concerned itself with the quality of the environment. Change in attitude and action in this sector requires time and the exertion of considerable social and political pressure. Instead, in the Schiphol decision-making process, a compromise was sought that fit within the existing mental framework of the parties. The most important lesson of the aftermath of this case is that consensus building is not a onetime venture. It is an ongoing process of problem solving that must take account of new developments as they emerge. ♦♦

∞ COMMENTARY

There, after a bit of meandering, you have it: An effort at social exploration of new approaches turned out to be an exercise in the management of dissent. This result reveals a tension in the idea of consensus building as problem solving. Problem solving as the discovery, through practical deliberation, of new solutions (which the participants could not, given their "existing mental framework," have imagined but for their commitment to investigate their differences)? Or problem solving as the fixing or arbitration of conflict so that each of the parties satisfies enough of the original demands to make it worthwhile—for the moment at least—to proceed with the deal? The emphasis in the cases is on the first interpretation, but as this story shows, despite exhortations to openness and inclusiveness, it is easy enough to settle for the second. (Political scientists might be tempted to think the Dutch government, and entities working closely with it, could be especially prone to this interpretation because of the country's long experience with split-the-difference, interest-balancing neo-corporatism. But keep in mind that collective bargaining functioned for decades by similar principles in the United States, and consensus building can, in some variants, be thought of as a way of applying the nonlitigious forms of dispute resolution familiar from the collective bargaining regime in its heyday to other realms.) Presumably, a more precise idea of what I call in Case 2 *rolling or rippling representation* would at least suggest standards and tests of openness that would warn of the danger of such self-defeating closure. Without such standards, surprises of the kind described here are consensus building accidents waiting to happen.

—Charles F. Sabel, *Political economist*

After the plan had seen the light of day, the Dutch government formally assented to

the extension of the airport. Key assumptions were that the airport could grow to a

maximum of 44 million passengers and 3.3 million metric tons of freight per annum and that this capacity would be reached around the year 2015. Requirements regarding noise, air pollution, nuisance by way of odor, and external safety were also promulgated, and a fifth runway planned, which was to be situated so as to reduce the discomfort of nearby residents.

It has become obvious in recent years, however, that the assumptions on which these projections and decisions were based were not realistic. The airport experienced a much speedier growth than anticipated, and the rapid development threatens to undermine efforts to maintain environmental standards. The fifth runway is being challenged in court by various environmental groups. These groups had not been involved in the consensus process, and they

oppose any increase in air traffic. Furthermore, new research established that the quality of the environment surrounding the airport is actually worse than previously assumed.

As a result of these new developments, Schiphol continues to dominate the political agenda; instead of consensus, new conflict situations arise and trust in the government's ability to fill the roles of arbitrator and manager has eroded. For all the stakeholders, it has become obvious that a more fundamental approach is desirable. Everything is once again open to discussion, including the country's need for a second airport. On this issue, a more comprehensive and inclusive debate is taking place than was the case with the expansion of Schiphol.

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